

Session 1.2

Upstream versus Downstream Rivalry

This session gives another example of the strategic form and how to find a pure strategy **Nash equilibrium**, or **NE** for short. To some extent firms don't just compete *horizontally*, but also *vertically*. This example is a simple illustration of the strategic issues that can arise.

Competition through integration

◆ In this game, a specialized supplier of components for a durable good has the option of integrating downstream.

◆ For example the supplier could start its own dealerships.

◆ A retailer who markets the good could integrate upstream and produce its own store brand.

	Retailer	Supplier
	distribute only	assemble and distribute
make components	1 5 6	4 0 5
make components and assemble	2 4 3	5 1 4
make components, assemble and distribute	3 3 2	6 2 1

◆ The supplier's profits are higher if the retailer only distributes.

◆ The more integrated the supplier, the lower the retailer's profits.

Best replies of the retailer

- ◆ If the **supplier assembles** but does **not distribute**, then the **retailer** should also integrate upstream, and assemble too.
- ◆ Otherwise the most profitable course of action of the **retailer** is to focus on **distribution**.

◆ The arrows indicate the best replies of the **retailer**.

◆ Notice the **retailer's** best reply depends on the **supplier's** strategy.

	distribute only	assemble and distribute
make components	1 6	4 5
make components and assemble	2 3	5 4
make components, assemble and distribute	3 2	6 1

Best replies of the supplier

- ◆ If the **retailer integrates upstream**, the supplier makes higher profits by undertaking more **downstream integration**, to avoid being squeezed.
- ◆ If the **retailer** confines itself to distribution, then the best reply of the **supplier** is to focus on its **core competency**, and only produce component parts.
- ◆ The arrows show the **supplier's** best replies.
- ◆ Even though the middle strategy is never a best reply it is never the worst strategy either.

	distribute only	assemble and distribute
make components	1 5	4 0
make components and assemble	2 4	5 1
make components, assemble and distribute	3 3	6 2

NE for integration game

- ◆ The NE is (make components, distribute only), with payoffs is (5,6).
- ◆ To verify this claim, note that if the retailer chooses to distribute only by moving Left, the best reply of the supplier is to only make components, by moving Up.
- ◆ Similarly if the supplier moves to Up, then the best reply of the retailer is to move Left.
- ◆ By inspecting the other cells one can check there is no other NE in this game.
- ◆ In this game the NE is unique.

NE illustrated

- ◆ Only at the NE are there no arrows leading out of the box.
- ◆ This is a defining characteristic of NE, and provides a quick way of locating them all in a matrix form game.

	Retailer	Supplier
	distribute only	assemble and distribute
make components	-1, 6 5	4, 5 0
make components and assemble	2, 3 4	5, 4 1
make components, assemble and distribute	-3, 2 3	6, 1 2

A chain of conjectures

The NE is supported by a **chain of conjectures** each player might hold about the other. Suppose:

S, the Supplier, thinks that R, the Retailer, plays Left

=> S plays Up;

R thinks that "S thinks that R plays Left"

=> R thinks that "S plays Up"

=> R plays Left;

S thinks that "R thinks that S thinks that R plays Left"

=> S thinks that "R plays Left"

=> S plays Up;

and so on.